Autonomy and the Orthodoxy of Human Superiority by Gruzalski, Bart
Autonomy and the 
Orthodoxy of Human 
Superiority 
Bart Gruzalski 
Pacific Center for Sustainable Living 
Editors' Note: An earlier version of this 
paper by Bart Gruzalski, the response by 
Professor Frey, and the reply by Gruzalski 
were presented at the Pacific Division 
meetings of the Society for the Study of 
Ethics and Animals, held in San Francisco, 
March, 1993. 
The capacity to propose an end to oneself is 
the characteristic ofhwnanity (as distinguished 
from animality). Immanuel Kant} 
What is this joy? That no animal falters, but 
knows what it must do? Denise Levertov2 
Philosophers, who rarely agree on anything, have 
reached a surprisingly strong consensus that human life, 
because of autonomy, is more valuable than nonhuman 
life. According to the consensus view, our lives are more 
valuable than the lives of nonhuman animals because 
of a richness in our lives that derives from autonomy 
and autonomy-based abilities, with an emphasis on an 
ability to mold our life to some conception we have of 
how life should be. The great 19th century philosopher 
Immanuel Kant expressed an early version of the 
consensus account when he wrote: "The capacity to 
propose an end to oneself is the characteristic of 
humanity (as distinguished from animality)."3 Below I 
will discuss two contemporary philosophers who express 
and defend versions of this consensus view. 
Because nonhuman animals exhibit some degree 
of what may be taken to be autonomy, we must clarify 
the degree of autonomy presupposed by the consensus 
account. To do this, it will be helpful to contrast how 
we are when we cook, or make chairs, or give lectures, 
with how we are when we become cooks, or fiecome 
carpenters, or become teachers. When we do any of the 
latter, we likely will have standards, values and 
ambitions, and might mold our lives in accord with 
them. This will automatically involve us in a more 
sophisticated kind of autonomy than just the ability to 
make choices. Goats and chickens make choices, but 
we do not believe that they use standards and values 
to mold their choices, their lives, or to live out some 
ambition. Someone who just cooks may not do that 
either, but a person who thinks of himself as a cook, 
who wants to become a better cook, or a respected 
cook-that clearly brings in ambitions we do not 
believe we share with goats and chickens. It is in 
this fuller sense of autonomy, the sense in which we 
have standards and can mold our lives in accord with 
them, that our lives allegedly are richer and, hence, 
of more value. 
For our lives to be more valuable than the lives of 
nonhuman animals because we are autonomous, each 
of the following claims would need to be true: 
1. autonomy does add positive value to a life, and 
2. a life with this added value is typically more 
valuable than any life lacking autonomy. 
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Claim (2) is important in order to insure lhatlhe value 
added by autonomy is not balanced by some ability a 
non-autonomous being might have, e.g., lhe ability to 
fly like a bird. We will explore lhese claims in turn. 
Does autonomy add positive value to a life? 
We begin wilh (l). Are our lives betler lhan lhey olherwise 
would be because we are able to live out our conceptions 
of lhe good life and judge ourselves and olhers? A 
negative answer leaps to mind: because of lhe way people 
lry to live out conceptions of lhe good life, we have 
genocide, rape, murder, depression, nuclear bombs, 
eradicaled rain forests, extinctions, a depleled ozone layer, 
lhe greenhouse effect, and olher conditions lhat make 
our own species vulnerable to extinction. Scientists 
have become so concerned about lhe environmenlal 
ramifications of humans lrying to live out conceptions 
of lhe good life lhat lhe Union of Concerned Scientists 
issued a "Warning to Humanity" signed by a majority of 
lhe living Nobel science laureates in December, 1992. 
That document wamed: "If not checked, many of our 
current practices put at serious risk lhe future lhat we 
wish for human society and the plant and animal 
kingdoms, and may so alter lhe living world lhat it will 
be unable to suslain life in lhe manner we know."4 
This negative answer about whelher our lives are 
beller than they otherwise would be because of 
autonomy is plausible. But taking an external 
perspective does not address whelher autonomy adds a 
dimension of value from an inner perspective, the 
perspective from which autonomy plausibly might add 
value to life and lhe perspective at stake in discussions 
wilhin contemporary western philosophy.s In what 
follows, I focus only on the value of a life to its 
possessor, on whelher an individual life is valuable from 
the inner perspective of lhat life. Given an inner 
perspective, it does seem plausible lhat an ability to 
judge and mold a life, an ability lhat requires intellec-
tualizing, judging, and effort, adds positive value. 
We find challenges even to lhis view. Christ, for 
example, tells us to '~udge not," suggesting lhatlhe life 
of planning, worrying and striving are notlhe way to be: 
And why take ye thought for raiment? 
Consider lhe lilies of lhe field, how lhey grow; 
they toil not, neilher do lhey spin; and yet I 
say unto you, That even Solomon in all his 
glory was not arrayed like one of lhese.... Take 
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lherefore no lhought for lhe morrow: for lhe 
morrow shall take lhought for lhe lhings of 
itself.{Matlhew: 6:28-31) 
Reflections like lhese may support doubts about whelher 
our ability to be autonomous and so be complicated, 
unspontaneous, and "in our heads" makes our lives more 
valuable from an inner perspective lhan lhe lives of 
beings who are spontaneous and more in touch wilh 
lhings of lhe heart. 
These doubts are not alien to us. In mylh, song, and 
bolh philosophical and religious works, we are often 
taught to lose our self-consciousness, to be natural and 
spontaneous, to stop worrying, and, in short, to become 
more instinctive, intuitive, and animal-like. We oflen 
lhink we become better and wiser when we transcend 
lhe self-conscious rationality celebraled in lhe orlhodox 
view as a constituent of what enriches our lives and so 
makes lhem more valuable lhan lhe lives of nonhuman 
animals. When Zen masler Bankei said, "my miracle is 
that when I feel hungry I eat, and when I feellhirsty I 
drink," he was expressing precisely lhis at-one-ness 
from which we in lhe "modern" world often feel 
alienaled because ofour self-conscious and judgmenlal 
approach to life. 
But philosophers have provided reasons in support 
of lhe consensus view, and we shall examine two of lhem. 
a. Philosopher Susan Wolf claims lhatlhe life of an 
autonomous being is richer and, hence, more 
valuable than the life of a non-autonomous being 
because wilh autonomy comes lhis ability to be 
moral. A being who has lhe ability to be moral is 
assumed superior to a being who lacks lhe ability. 
b. Philosopher Raymond Frey claims that the 
exercise of autonomy leads to more felt satis-
faction lhan, apparently, what is available to beings 
lacking autonomy. We will examine each oflhese 
reasons in turn. 
(a) The superiority ofa being who can be nwral 
According to philosopher Susan Wolf, most philos-
ophers lhink human beings are more valuable lhan 
chickens and goats for lhe following reasons: 
What is especially valuable about persons is 
connected to lhe factlhat persons live, or have 
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the potential to live, richer lives than other 
beings. Persons are capable of aspiring to and 
achieving a diversity of ideals... are capable 
of... exhibiting and appreciating moral virtue, 
and of understanding and committing them-
selves to morallaws.6 
Physician and philosopher Willard Gaylin also claims 
that human beings are superior to nonhuman beings 
because we human beings can develop "that awareness 
of the right and good which enables us to act rationally, 
justly and virtuously thus defining human beings as the 
only moral animal."? But are they correct: are the lives 
of beings who are able to be moral more valuable than 
the lives of beings who lack this ability? 
The argument that lives enabled by autonomy are 
more valuable than lives lacking autonomy because 
autonomous beings alone have the ability to act morally 
rests on two claims. First, the claim that humans are 
the only moral animal. Second, that being able to act 
morally, or to refrain from acting morally, shows we 
are superior to beings who lack this ability. For the 
purposes of discussion, let us assume what is 
controversial, namely, that nonhumans do not have the 
ability to act morally or to respond to moral realities. 
Does this, of itself, resolve our question about worth 
and superiority? 
Once we posit that humans alone are able to respond 
to moral concerns, we may seem to have already 
conceded tlmt we are "superior" to nonhumans. This is 
what Willard Gaylin assumes when he claims that our 
moral qualities make us human and "elevate" us "above 
the common animal host."g That is, of course, one 
natural way to look at the matter. We "have" more, so 
we are "better. " But are we correct in believing that 
the ability to be moral, and so the ability to be immoral. 
makes us better than beings that lack this ability? 
Consider the following passage about beings for 
whom moral laws have no practical implications 
because the choices made by such beings and the moral 
law are necessarily in unison: 
The "ought" is here out of place, for the 
volition of itself is necessarily in unison with 
the law.9 
The passage is from Kant, the will which is not restricted 
by such obligations is referred to as a holy will, and the 
holy will cannot but act in uni~on with the law. Kant's 
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notion of a holy will is important and relevant for our 
discussion, since it shows that a being can lack an ability 
and yet be "superior" to a being which has this additional 
capacity. According to Kant, God's will is a holy will: 
God cannot but act in accordance with the law, and yet 
God's will is superior to the imperfect human will which 
can and often does act contrary to the law. That God 
lacks the ability to be moral (or immoral) is sufficient 
to show that this ability does not make a life inherently 
more valuable than a life lacking this ability. Our 
assumption that nonhuman animals cannot make moral 
choices and that the "ought" is out of place for them 
does not, therefore, show that our lives are more 
valuable than theirs. 
That nonhuman animals lack autonomy is not only 
consistent with the view that nonhuman animals do not 
need to be restricted by laws of morality, but is also 
consistent with the view that they act spontaneously 
and in this way may be superior to us. In her poem, 
"Come IntoAnimal Presence," Denise Levertov evokes 
this possibility. After noticing that "the llama intricately 
folding its hind legs to be seated not disdains but 
mildly disregards human approval" and remarking on 
her own "joy when the insouciant armadillo glances 
at us and doesn't quicken his trotting across the track 
into the palm brush," she raises a question that gives 
rise to a pertinent answer: "What is this joy? That no 
animal falters but knows what it must do?" She builds 
on this theme, ending her poem with reflections on 
holiness and joy: 
...The llama 
rests in dignity, the armadillo 
has some intention to pursue in the palm-forest. 
Those who were sacred have remained so. 
holiness does not dissolve, it is a presence 
of bronze, only the sight that saw it 
faltered and turned from it. 
An old joy returns in holy presence. LO 
The poet suggests that we are not as holy as spontaneous 
nonhuman animals and that our added capacity to assess 
what we should do not only fails to make us superior 
but, by causing us to "falter," opens up the possibility 
that they are superior to us. 
We have explored whether our lives are more 
valuable than the lives of nonhuman animals because 
our autonomy confers upon us the ability to be moral. 
What we find is that the ability to be moral does not 
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make our lives inherently more valuable than lives 
lacking this ability. Hence, even if we assume, what is 
controversial, that nonhumans lack the ability to be 
moral, it does not follow from this "lack" that their lives 
are less valuable than our own. 
(b) "Considerable satisfaction"and 
the more valuable life 
There is a second defense of the consensus account. 
According to this defense, the exercise of autonomy 
leads to more felt satisfactions. Philosopher R. G. Frey 
expresses this view as follows: 
By exercising our autonomy or agency, we 
can mold and shape our lives to fit a concep-
tion of the good life of our own choosing, and 
living out this conception can itself supply us 
with a strong sense of achievement and of 
self-fulfillment, and, through these, with 
considerable satisfaction.... Nothing compa-
rable exists among the non-autonomous. We 
have here, then, a further reason for thinking 
that the lives of normal humans are much 
richer than those of infants, defective humans, 
and animals. II 
If we do experience more satisfaction than beings 
lacking our degree of autonomy, that might provide 
some plausibility to the thought that our lives had a 
higher quality than beings who do not experience 
these autonomy-related satisfactions. But do the 
autonomous experience more satisfaction than those 
who lack autonomy? 
The exercise ofautonomy, on Frey's account, involves 
pursuit: shaping and molding our lives to fit an idea we 
have of how we want our lives to become. According to 
Frey, implementing our idea of the good life causes us 
positive feelings. This is the source of the value unique 
to autonomous lives: the positive feelings coming from 
successful pursuits of the good life of our choosing. 
When we investigate the details of the likelihood of 
increased satisfaction for the autonomous, Frey's claim 
becomes less plausible. Although Frey writes in terms 
of success ("living out this conception"), the best we 
can do is to try to implement our conception of the good 
life. That, of course, involves us not only in successes, 
but in failures. We must weigh each of these outcomes 
in our final assessment of the value of autonomy. 
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When we are not successful, we do not have more 
felt satisfaction-instead, we may experience feelings 
of failure, frustration, and disappointment, or even 
feelings of anger and despair, and, so, much less 
satisfaction. Failures in achieving our ideas of the good 
life of our choosing do not support Frey's evaluation of 
the autonomous life as better. So, let us assume at least 
initial success. Does initial success insure positive 
satisfaction for the autonomous? 
When we are successful, typically we are in one of 
two situations. Either we have succeeded in a way that 
seems permanent-achieved better health, improved 
our job situation, purchased a home, entered into a 
promising relationship, made money, enhanced our 
reputation-or we have succeeded in enjoying 
something that we know to be momentary-a concert, 
a kiss, a meal. 
Once we've obtained what is in the more permanent 
group, generally we will desire to keep or improve on 
these goods. Our wanting to keep what seems permanent 
involves us in new efforts and a new round of successes 
and failures. Impermanence has many faces: sickness 
and accidents undermine health; relationships change; 
jobs become undesirable; natural disasters destroy 
homes; expenses drain savings; and reputations are 
mercurial. Even if we are able to "hold on" until old 
age, in dying we must lose everything that we pursued 
and acquired. Trying to keep any of these goods 
eventually leads to the experience of loss. 
When we turn to the enjoyment of what is clearly 
momentary, we will want to experience these goods 
again under the appropriate conditions. The tendency 
of desire for more and better makes it more difficult to 
recreate satisfactory momentary pleasures. Concerts, 
meals and kisses each suffer from heightened 
expectations, for satisfactorily repeating an experience, 
especially when we have higher expectations for that 
experience, becomes more difficult than earlier 
successes with lower expectations. Frustration at these 
difficulties is also part of the desire-oriented way of life. 
These reflections constitute the first reason for 
doubting that the exercise of autonomy leads to more 
overall satisfaction: it is precisely the frustration of our 
preferences, plans and ambitions that causes much 
human suffering. Our most important desires-for 
example, that we and our loved ones do not die-will 
be frustrated, and the amount of felt dissatisfaction from 
thwarted preferences plausibly defeats whatever 
positive value satisfied preferences add to a life. 
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Tbe second reason for doubting tbe overall 
satisfaction of the autonomous life is that the exercise 
ofautonomy, on Frey's account, requires that we attempt 
to make cbanges and, so, pulls our attention from the 
present and puts it on wbat may bappen in the future. 
By attending to wbat is not present, we are not as fully 
appreciative of whatever is unfolding. For example, if 
I am biking up a bill and am thinking about the vista I 
am about to reacb, I will be less attentive to the flora 
along the trail.J2 In this way, we miss sunsets, the taste 
of our meals, the subtle colors of the trees along our 
roadways, and the songs of birds. 
We can be lost to the present by focusing either on 
the future or on the past, as the following Zen story 
about two monks illustrates: 
Tanzan and Ekido were once traveling together 
down a muddy road. A beavy rain was falling. 
Coming around a bend, they met a lovely girl 
in a silk kimono and sasb, unable to cross the 
intersection. 
Winter & Spring 1996 
"Come on, girl," said Tanzan at once. Lifting 
ber in bis arms, be carried ber over the mud. 
Ekido did not speak again until that nigbt wben 
they reacbed a lodging temple. Tben be no 
longer could restrain bimself. "We monks 
don't go near females," be told Tanzan , 
"especially not young and lovely ones. It is 
dangerous. Wby did you do that?" 
"I left the girl there," said Tanzan. "Are you still 
carrying ber?13 
One imagines Ekido, as they walked along, judging 
Tanzan negatively. It is not implausible to think that 
Ekido did not notice the birds and plants along the road 
as fully as be otherwise would bave were be not thinking 
about what was past (Tanzan's lifting the girl) and about 
the future (wbetber, wbat and wben be would say 
something to Tanzan). All of this, it is plausible, put 
Ekido in a rather sour mood, bis judgmentalness itself 
diminisbing the felt satisfactions of the experience. 
Tbat judgmentalness undermines the quality of 
momentary experiences is the third reason for thinking 
that Frey's account of the value of autonomy is not 
plausible, since the functions of autonomy involve 
implicit judgments that things are not good enougb 
the way they are. For example, we strive for acbieve-
ment and more fulfillment because we bave a 
conception of the good life that we believe we are not 
fully realizing. Since we can imagine bow almost any 
experience, situation, relationsbip, or success can be 
better-nearer to perfection, more intense, more 
refined-judgmentalness can undermine the satisfac-
toriness of experiences, situations, relationsbips, and 
successes and, so, depreciate their quality. 
Motivated by this tendency to judge as not fully 
adequate wbat otherwise migbt bave proven to be 
completely satisfactory, we find ourselves turning to 
accumulation, competition, and wbat is sanctioned by 
those in society wbom we respect, envy, or admire. As 
a result we typically come to discount precisely wbat 
we found full of wonder wben we were cbildren and 
wbat those wbo are dying often say is truly valuable. 
Recall Ivan Ilycb, a successful and wealthy judge, on 
bis deathbed: 
And in imagination be began to recall the best 
moments of bis pleasant life... the further be 
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departed from childhood and the nearer he carne 
to the present the more worthless and doubtful 
were thejoys.... then that deadly official life and 
those preoccupations about money .... It 
occurred to him that what had appeared 
perfectly impossible before, namely that he had 
not spent his life as he should have done, might 
after all be true....his professional duties...and 
social and official interests... false. 14 
Molding our lives to fit some idea we have of what is 
good can easily cause us to pursue what society or others 
claim is valuable and, so, discount precisely what was 
available and could have been perfectly satisfactory but 
for our judgmentalness. 
This is hardly a message only from the dying.15 In 
the following, from an interview on environmental 
issues, Dave Foreman has been asked when he is the 
happiest. Foreman answers: 
When I'm not thinking abstractly. When I am 
being fully an animal, when I'm in the middle 
of a rapid on the river and having to respond 
to the river. I'm happiest when I experience 
the moment entirely for what it is. I'm happiest 
when I'm bird-watching, or when I'm walking 
down a trail in the wilderness and the internal 
dialogue finally ceases-I'm just there in the 
place. Our physical adaptation is for running 
or moving through wild country. That's when 
we're truly human and truly alive.... I recently 
had the joy of my life when I came in contact 
with a Jaguar on the Monkey River in Belize. 
Rationality ceased, abstraction ceased. We 
ignore the fact that we need wilderness around 
us to be mentally healthy.16 
Foreman claims to be happiest when rationality and 
abstraction cease, when he is experiencing the present 
as it is. And also, we can surmise, when judgmentalness 
ceases. Think of how Foreman's experience of the 
jaguar changes if he's judging: Is this jaguar one of the 
biggest reported? Or: Will it make a good photograph? 
Or: Has this jaguar been documented in any scientific 
study? Any of those perspectives, easily part ofa "good 
life of our choosing," would take away from the quality 
of the experience that Foreman describes. And what 
makes the diminutive difference is the addition of the 
faculty of judging. 
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The exercise of autonomy, as Frey describes it, 
involves the autonomous in attachments and pursuits 
that, when disappointed, will cause suffering. It requires 
that the autonomous not attend as fully as they can to 
the present moment and thereby diminishes the quality 
of momentary experiences. And it involves the 
autonomous in making judgments that diminish felt 
satisfactions. In short, it is not plausible to think that 
autonomy adds positive qualities to a life. The Buddha 
confirms this conclusion in the Second Noble Truth, 
where he states that it is our attachment to desire and 
aversion that causes our suffering. All of this 
undermines the plausibility of the claim that, when 
everything is taken into account, the exercise of 
autonomy adds satisfaction to a life. 
Would a value added by autonomy surpass any 
other added values? 
In examining these two defenses of the claim that 
autonomy makes our lives more valuable, we have seen 
that this orthodoxy is plausibly false. Nonetheless, it 
will be useful to proceed to the second question, 
modified to reflect our discussion so far. So modified, 
our question becomes: Supposing, apparently contrary 
to fact, that autonomy did add value to a life, are lives 
with the added dimension of value supplied by 
autonomy more valuable than lives without this value? 
The added dimension of value in question comes 
from our having an ability to judge and to mold our 
lives. What reason, that is not question-begging, could 
possibly show that this ability, unique to normal adult 
human animals, makes our lives more valuable than 
the lives of other apparently satisfied animals, human 
or nonhuman, who did not have this ability? All of us 
are able human beings; we pursue what we think of as 
good-but does this make our lives more valuable than 
the life of a Canadian goose or a severely retarded 
person with Down's Syndrome? The Canadian goose 
has the ability to fly, can ride air currents, read weather 
patterns, and migrate many hundreds ofmiles annually. 
Down's Syndrome persons tend to be happier and more 
loving than those of us who are "normal." Our abilities 
differ from those of geese, and those of us in the bustle 
of urban or academic life are typically not as happy or 
loving as the person with Down's Syndrome. But we 
knew all of this at the start. To add that our abilities 
make us superior seems only to beg an evaluative 
question by assuming precisely what is in question. 
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Tbe most we seem justified to say, in addressing 
question (2), is that we lead lives that in many ways 
are similar to the lives of other animals, and in some 
ways are different. 
Conclusion 
In this paper I have chronicled tbe failure of two 
defenses for the orthodoxy that the autonomous life is 
more valuable than the non-autonomous life. We have 
also seen why it becomes plausible to think that the 
very traits we bave been inclined to cite as the grounds 
of our human superiority may, contrary to orthodox 
opinion, diminish the quality and the fullness of the 
lives we lead. This possibility suggests that it may not 
be "we" who are superior, but our animal brothers and 
sisters who live out their own natures in a more 
spontaneous fashion. To many of us, this would seem 
like a perverse pronouncement, which seems part of 
what the poet Blake had in mind when he wrote: 
As I was walking among the fires of hell, 
delighted with the enjoyments of Genius, 
which to Angels look like torment and insanity, 
I collected some of their Proverbs; thinking 
that as the sayings used in a nation mark its 
character, so the Proverbs of Hell shew the 
nature of Infernal Wisdom better than any 
description of buildings or garments. 
When I came home: on the abyss of the five 
senses, where a flat sided steep frowns over 
the present world, I saw a mighty Devil folded 
in black clouds, hovering on the sides of the 
rock, with corroding fires he wrote the 
following sentence now perceived by the 
minds of men, & read by them on earth: 
How do you know but ev'ry Bird that cuts the 
airy way, 
[san immense world ofdelight, clos'd by your 
senses five?17 
And, surely, there is nothing in our argumentation or 
thinking that would even begin to show that birds 
are not happy and blissful: they sing in the morning, 
fly in play, care devotedly for their young, and finally 
sing again towards dusk. How many humans sing or 
playas well? Even Christ, in the Sermon on the 
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Mount, used birds as an example of how we should 
be, instead of how we are when we worry about 
sowing and reaping. 
Ancestors of this paper were also presented 
at a Central Division American Philosophical 
Association meeting and a colloquium at 
Northeastern University. 
I am grateful for comments on the earlier 
versions of this paper by, among others, 
Michael Bradie, David DeGrazia, R. G. Frey, 
Rama Rao Pappu, and Steve Sapontzis. 
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12 I may also be less satisfied when I reach the vista-if 
my expectations are too high-precisely because of my 
forward-looking approach. But that is the third problem with 
Frey's argument, thatjudgmentalness (concomitant with high 
expectations) diminishes the felt satisfactions even of 
experiences that would have been perfectly satisfactory 
otherwise. 
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attitudes and insights through the dying experience has been 
confirmed as both realistic and not uncommon by those who 
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Wilson Gruzalski, who has founded two hospices, developed 
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Response: 
Autonomy, Animals, and 
Conceptions of The Good 
R. G. Frey 
Bowling Green State University 
In a number of recent articles on animal issues, I I have 
set out one view of the comparative value of human 
and animal life. It is a view consonant both with my 
earlier writings on animals2 and with the emphasis upon 
quality of life accounts of the value of life that are so 
much a part of contemporary writing in medical ethics 
and in applied ethics generally. Numerous details of 
this quality of life view remain to be filled in, of course, 
but its general outline, I think, is clear enough. Even in 
general outline, however, some philosophers and others 
have found the view wanting, if not in its entirety, then 
certainly in some of its more prominent features. One 
feature that has proved especially controversial is that 
the value of some human lives can turn out to be of a 
quality so low as to be exceeded in value by the lives of 
some perfectly healthy animals, which in tum can have 
implications for, say, which creatures are to be used in 
medical experimentation. Another such feature, it would 
appear, has been my remarks on the role of autonomy 
in the value of human, as opposed to, animallives.3 
Bart Gruzalski's paper "Autonomy and The Myth of 
Human Superiority" is very much in this latter vein. I 
should like here briefly to respond to some of 
Gruzalski's comments, before trying to bring more 
sharply into focus certain features of the comparative 
view of the value of human and animal life that I hold. 
(In what follows, I leave aside Gruzalski's remarks on 
other philosophers.) 
In a way, it is odd that Gruzalski puts me in the 
camp of those who espouse human "superiority." Most 
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